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ABSTRACT. The chapter tackles the complex, tension-ridden, and often 
paradoxical relationship between relativism and conservatism. We focus 
particularly on radical conservatism, an early twentieth-century German movement 
that arguably constitutes the climax of conservatism’s problematic relationship with 
relativism. We trace the shared genealogy of conservatism and historicism in 
nineteenth-century Counter-Enlightenment thought and interpret radical 
conservatism’s ambivalent relation to relativism as reflecting this heritage. 
Emphasizing national particularity, historical uniqueness, and global political 
plurality, Carl Schmitt and Hans Freyer moved in the tradition of historicism, 
stopping short of full relativism. Yet they utilized relativistic elements – such as 
seeing irrational decisions or the demands of “life” as the basis of politics – to 
discredit notions of universal political morality and law, thereby underpinning their 
authoritarian agendas. Oswald Spengler, by contrast, took the relativistic impulses 
to the extreme, interweaving his conservative authoritarianism and nationalism 
with full-fledged epistemic, moral, and political relativism. Martin Heidegger has 
recently been perceived as the key philosopher of radical conservatism, and his 
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thought arguably channeled antimodern aspects of historicism into contemporary 
political thought. We conclude by analyzing how some radical conservative 
arguments involving cultural relativism and plurality still reverberate in 
contemporary theorists such as Samuel Huntington, Aleksandr Dugin, and Alain 
de Benoist. 
1. Introduction 
The relationship between conservative political thought and relativism is complex and tension-
ridden. Many contemporary conservatives see cultural relativism as undermining communal life and, 
in the footsteps of Leo Strauss (1953, 9–34), point their finger at historicism (see Bloom 1987, 25, 
34, 38–39), the tendency to relativize human thought and morality to their historical contexts. 
However, as Strauss (1953, 13–16) points out, modern conservatism and historicism have common 
roots in the Counter-Enlightenment’s opposition to ideas underlying the French Revolution, such as 
natural law and universal progress. In its criticism of the unhistorical outlook of Enlightenment 
progressive rationalism, nineteenth-century German historicism “inevitably became a powerful ally 
of Conservatism” (Epstein 1966, 74). We argue that the key link between conservatism and relativism 
can be found in historicism. 
Historicism was a predominantly German intellectual trend. Arguably, many key features of 
modern conservatism culminated in the German version of conservatism of the Weimar period often 
known as the “conservative revolution,” but more comprehensively and accurately characterized as 
“radical conservatism” (Muller 1997; Dahl 1999). German thinkers took the intellectual 
developments behind classical conservatism to their “logical conclusion” (Mannheim 1925, 47), 
producing a radicalized, ardently antiliberal conservatism in which, we argue, conservatism’s 
problematic relationship with relativism comes to a head. 
We focus here on German radical conservatism and its shifting relationship with relativism. 
After mapping the common genesis of the German conservative and historicist traditions, we study 
relativistic aspects of twentieth-century radical conservatism and conservative aspects of 
Heideggerian philosophical hermeneutics, arguably the most important philosophical offspring of 
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German historicism. We conclude with a brief overview of the legacy of these trends in contemporary 
conservative thought. 
 
2. Historicism and conservatism 
The roots of historicism go back to the eighteenth century. Already Giambattista Vico, often 
considered the father of modern philosophy of history, questioned timeless and abstract principles 
and emphasized the historicity of reason. Not all peoples advanced concurrently in Vico’s 
developmental scheme of aristocracy, democracy, and monarchy; rather, governments must conform 
to the nature of the people governed (Vico 1744, 99, 440). Montesquieu (1748), in turn, emphasized 
the effects of the climate on citizens’ mentality, social conventions, laws, and the form of government 
suitable for a given nation. 
This type of political and cultural relativism was pivotal to classical conservatism’s critique of 
the ideas of rational progress and the ideal constitution underlying the French Revolution. 
Chateaubriand (1797, 255, 297–298) maintained that any form of government could only be 
evaluated in terms of the needs of the nation and its natural constitution. Edmund Burke (1790, 27, 
129) considered it “fanaticism” to regard, for example, monarchy or democracy as the only correct 
form of government and refused to reprobate any political form “merely upon abstract principle.” 
Jerry Z. Muller (1997, 7, 11–12) links classical conservatism with “historical utilitarianism” according 
to which the merits of any societal institution are deduced from its historical survival, and with 
“historicism and particularism” according to which institutions are a product of human development 
rather than natural law or unchanging human qualities. It follows that expedient institutions vary 
widely across societies, eras, and traditions, and conservatism carries primarily a “procedural” 
emphasis on the need for institutions in general to regulate human action and keep egoistic 
aspirations at check, rather than a “substantive” commendation of particular institutions. 
A more full-fledged form of historicism emerged within the German Enlightenment and 
Sturm und Drang proto-Romanticism. Friedrich Meinecke (1936, 235, 295) identifies a “new sense of 
history” in the late-eighteenth-century German movement represented particularly by Justus Möser, 
Johann Gottfried von Herder, and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Herder, who emphasized the 
historical and linguistic particularity of ideas, ranks as one of the founders of modern cultural 
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relativism and philosophical hermeneutics, but was, despite his profound sense of national 
uniqueness, a liberal-minded believer in human progress. Möser, by contrast, combined a notion of 
historical particularity with a conservative theory of the reason-of-state (Meinecke 1936, 281–291) 
that effectively jettisoned ideas of natural law and the ideal state, positing that the state as a historical 
formation had an inalienable individual character and that its primary duties were to safeguard and 
nurture the particularity of its existence in rivalry with other states. The idea of historical individuality 
entailed by these approaches provided relativism with a novel theoretical basis (Meinecke 1924, 18–
19, 377–380; 1936, 488–489). 
Isaiah Berlin (1980, 71–72, 79–80, 87) argues that neither Enlightenment nor proto-Romantic 
historicists advocated strict cultural or moral relativism, but rather historical pluralism. What was 
common to all human beings manifested itself in dissimilar, potentially conflicting, and even 
incommensurable ways in different historical situations, but the irreducible plurality of values did not 
entail a lack of foundation or standards. This form of historicism is fundamentally akin to that of 
Hegel, for whom different historical moral, social, and political systems were merely stages in the 
self-elaboration of universal objective spirit in the world – an argument that, in the conservative 
Right-Hegelian reading, implied that contemporary Prussia could be seen as the most developed form 
of Rechtsstaat. According to Berlin (1980, 77–78, 87–88), strong relativism only emerged in the 
nineteenth century with the antirationalism of German Romanticism, Arthur Schopenhauer, and 
Friedrich Nietzsche. 
In the most prominent German Romantics, such as Friedrich Schlegel and Novalis, we find, 
in addition to a new poetic subjectivism and relativism, historicism in the form of an “organic” view 
of the historical growth of unique cultural formations and nostalgia for premodern, tradition-bound 
communities. Mannheim (1925, 47, 127) reads Romantic organic historicism as “a product of the 
German conservative spirit” that initially emerged “as a political argument against the revolutionary 
breach with the past.” Ernst Troeltsch (1922, 285), however, observes that when detached from its 
original context, the theory of cultural growth could amalgamate with either conservative or liberal 
politics. The politically conservative use of organic historicism is exemplified by the German 
historical school of jurisprudence of Friedrich Carl von Savigny and Karl Friedrich Eichhorn, which 
insisted, against Enlightenment ideas of natural right, that law emanated from a historically and 
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culturally particular “national spirit” (Harstick 1974). Another example is Leopold von Ranke 
(1833/1836), the father of empiricist historicism in historiography, who opposed Hegelian teleology 
and the dissemination of the French revolutionary legacy through Napoleon’s attempt at “universal 
monarchy,” emphasizing the importance of organic, tradition-bound national identities. 
According to Friedrich Jaeger and Jörn Rüsen (1992, 101–104), classical historicism was 
eventually dissolved as German idealism gave way to Lebensphilosophie: abstract life, conceived in 
vitalistic and quasi-biological terms, now replaced creative cultural spirit as the driving force of 
history. Rather than ethical, cultural, and intellectual progress, history increasingly appeared as a 
natural, biologically evolving life-process that underneath remained qualitatively unchanged. One can 
identify several steps from historicism toward the eventual affirmation of constant change, novelty, 
and mobilization without an ideal of ultimate teleological progress, characteristic of twentieth-century 
radical conservatism. These include Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of the fundamentally aimless and 
purposeless will as the basic reality; Nietzsche’s notion of truths as temporary instrumental 
perspectives of the eternally recurring will to power; Wilhelm Dilthey’s grounding of all thought upon 
the continuous historical flow of lived experience; and Oswald Spengler’s organic and cyclic model 
of history. This turn from spirit to life had obvious political implications: while classical historicism, 
guided by an idea of an ultimately unified humanity, still implied binding standards for states’ actions, 
the apotheosis of life per se liberated radical nationalist politics from such bounds. Pure factual power 
now became a sufficient basis for political existence. 
 
3. Radical conservatism and relativism 
German radical conservatism was a loose intellectual movement of the Weimar era, inspired by the 
experiences of the world war. Rather than suggesting reactionary measures, it called for the creation 
of novel institutions by radical means in order to overcome the alleged egalitarian decay of modern 
liberal, democratic, and capitalist societies as well as the Marxist threat. It abandoned the traditional 
conservative postulate of “historical utility”: the fact that certain institutions had survived no longer 
spoke in their favor (Muller 1997, 29). Radical conservatives upheld conservative ideals such as 
wholeness, community, or authority, but rather than seeking to conserve the old, they underlined the 
need to “create values worth conserving” (Moeller van den Bruck 1923, 182) – by way of a 
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“conservative revolution,” if needed. The key thinkers of German radical conservatism in the wide 
sense include Carl Schmitt, Hans Freyer, Ernst Jünger, Oswald Spengler, Martin Heidegger, Arthur 
Moeller van den Bruck, Edgar Julius Jung, Ludwig Klages, and Othmar Spann. 
In accordance with the paradox inherent in conserving by revolutionizing, radical 
conservatism’s relationship with relativism is complex. While rejecting liberal democracy on the 
grounds of its alleged link with relativism and nihilism, these authors often utilized the disruptive 
power inherent in historicism and relativism against any remnants of Enlightenment universalism, 
elevating irrational decision, life, or power per se, or seeking to ground the novel idea of community 
in the inherent plurality of world history. Many called for cultural and national unity and resented 
liberal value pluralism as “relativism.” The sociologist Spann (1921, 63, 187–191) blamed the 
relativism inherent in the crisis of contemporary culture on individualistic social theories that 
allegedly led to nihilism and atomization, proposing in their stead a radically antidemocratic 
“universalistic” agenda relying on organic analogies. The political essayist Moeller van den Bruck 
(1923, 166–167) contrasted the conservative approach with the merely “relative” standpoints of 
liberal subjects, apparently always willing to change their views according to shallow opportunism. 
Such accusations carried a grain of truth, as many contemporary liberal democrats in fact 
endorsed a doctrine of relativism. Hans Kelsen (1929, 101–105), for example, maintained that 
political stances could not be verified or refuted rationally and that relativism, combined with an 
open market of opinions and an electoral system based on majority rule, was therefore the optimal 
democratic framework. Spann (1921, 116–117) criticized Kelsen’s political relativism for causing 
dissolution and anarchical factional struggles: liberal value relativism was a threat to political stability. 
Carl Schmitt similarly rejected pluralism for shattering political unity into latent civil war and 
accused Kelsen’s legal positivism of opening the door to relativism and nihilism (see Scheuemann 
1999, 64–65). For Schmitt (1922, 10, 39–41), the pluralist chaos could not be tamed by abstract 
norms or inherited customs; only a sovereign decision ex nihilo, without rational justification, could 
secure the foundation of both law and political order. This idea is iterated in Schmitt’s (1932, 26–27) 
concept of the political: any criterion can give rise to the political opposition between friend and 
enemy, and when a decision concerning the political enemy is in effect, it is instantaneous and 
intuitive, since the enemy is existentially alien and other. Schmitt’s theory of decision and existential 
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enmity has been criticized for implying the kind of nihilism he sought to avoid (Scheuerman 1999, 
79), and the aforementioned aspects suggest reading him as a theorist of post-foundationalism, 
difference-based identities, and subjectivism – a list easy to supplement with relativism. 
However, despite his radicalism, Schmitt operated within the tradition of historicist 
conservatism, emphasizing historical determination and particularity. In the early 1930s, he argued 
that key legal categories were determined by their particular national community and that all legal 
thought took place within “a historical, concrete, total order” (Schmitt 1934, 73). In his postwar 
historical work, Schmitt underscored the uniqueness of all historical truths and epochs (Lievens 
2011); however, this does not imply a lack of foundations, but rather entails that singular historical 
events and situations are comprehensible in the context of a concrete order even when decisions lack 
normative foundations. Schmitt’s (1932, 53) idea that the political world is a “pluriverse” rather than 
a universe is extendable into an overall theory of the global order and world history: there is always 
a plurality of such historically constituted units of decisions, and norms and orders are only 
comprehensible within their respective cultural and political spheres. Schmitt thus endorsed historical 
particularism and global pluralism, designed to manage the consequences of his antiuniversalistic 
notion of politics. This served his project of undermining liberal universalism in law and politics in 
favor of a “realistic” doctrine of international relations based on the equal right of states to wage 
wars and geopolitical segregation into several “great spaces” (Schmitt 1939–41). 
Hans Freyer shared Schmitt’s concept of the political, albeit with a post-Hegelian idealistic 
twist. Freyer saw politics as the historical implementation of cultural forms and ideas, emphasizing 
that the state represented a certain “unity of values” and that political deeds were necessitated by the 
historical moment (Freyer 1930, 105). These starting points suggest a monistic conception of the 
political community: for Freyer (1930, 108, 113), the objectively good in political life was that which 
served the development of the people and its historical mission. In the 1930s, for Freyer, the most 
topical political task of the mythical and singular Volk was to destroy the structures of “the industrial 
society” and liberate the state from particular “interests” – that is, to replace liberal democracy with 
authoritarianism (1931, 44–45). In his call for a mythical revolution from the right, Freyer represented 
radical, even revolutionary conservatism, justified by situational political ethics. However, a plurality 
of such historically conditioned ideas and particularistic political units always prevailed, and pluralism 
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was the essence of world history (1925, 23, 194–195, 211–212). Freyer’s modified Hegelianism 
allowed no overarching telos, but merely the tumult of numerous consecutive empires that rose and 
sunk based on their factual prowess, political will, and resolution. All power was contingent, 
historically conditioned, and valid only once. In keeping with German historicism and reason-of-
state theory, Freyer found the basis for political order in historical particularity and cultural 
uniqueness. 
Amongst the radical conservatives, Spengler (1918, 23–24, 46, 345, 364) took the relativistic 
impulse in historicism the furthest, denying eternal truths and universal morality and arguing that all 
standards were valid only within their respective cultural spheres. However, in his belief that the 
current “Faustian man” was best disposed to understand history in general, Spengler claimed 
universal validity for his own theory of history as cyclic and organic growth (see Falken 1988, 66–
67). Spengler’s epistemic and moral relativism built on the postulate that human beings existed only 
in terms of certain epochs and regions with their particular historical horizons (Spengler 1931, 30–
31). For Spengler, “humankind” was a fiction incapable of possessing shared goals or living a truly 
universal history (Merlio 2009, 134–135). This Counter-Enlightenment stance implies a twofold 
political relativism: first, there were no universal ideals, truths, or justice in international relations, 
only factual power and effect; second, there was no single optimal form of government, but each 
state was unique and constantly changing (Spengler 1922, 368–370, 401). Authoritarianism or 
monarchism were thus not optimal forms per se, but only the most suitable ones for Germany 
(Spengler 1920, 71). Spengler’s historicism was thus motivated by his conservative politics and 
extreme nationalism (Merlio 2009, 137). 
 
4. Heideggerian hermeneutics and conservatism 
Martin Heidegger is sometimes listed among the radical conservatives (Bourdieu 1988, 55–69; Dahl 
1999, 134–135) and recently Aleksandr Dugin (2010, 23–26, 171–173) has designated Heidegger as 
the philosopher of the conservative revolution. In the historical narrative of the later Heidegger, the 
Western metaphysical tradition was currently culminating in a total technological domination and 
homogenization of reality, which, however, opened the possibility of a post-metaphysical, 
postmodern “other beginning” of Western thinking, involving a profound rethinking of the Greek 
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beginning of philosophy. This idea of a cyclic movement through which nihilistic modernity was 
overcome by letting modernity radicalize and culminate itself, which allows us to turn back to the 
roots of our tradition in a novel sense, is indeed analogous to the basic model of a “conservative 
revolution.” 
Heidegger is in many ways an heir of nineteenth-century German historicism (see Barash 
2003). A key objective of the hermeneutic phenomenology of Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927) was 
to elaborate an account of the human Dasein’s dynamic, context-bound, and historically singular 
understanding of being (Sein) in order to articulate a radically temporal and historical “fundamental 
ontology.” This approach, which would make concepts, truths, and, ultimately, meaningfulness in 
general, historically situated, had obvious relativistic implications, which Heidegger accepted, noting 
that “fear of relativism is fear of Dasein” (Heidegger 1924, 20). In the 1930s, Heidegger’s focus 
increasingly turned from the individual Dasein to the Volk as the basic unit of politics, and here we 
encounter the familiar national particularism of the conservative tradition: for an authentic 
community of nations to emerge, each nation must assume “responsibility for itself” by discovering 
its particular historical “determination” (Heidegger 1933). In 1935, Heidegger (1935, 40–41) depicted 
the Germans as a “historical” people caught in “pincers” between the United States and the Soviet 
Union – two ahistorical, multinational, and technological world powers with universalistic ideologies. 
However, Heidegger (1938–39, 318–319; 1941–42, 80) was soon disillusioned with Nazism, coming 
to see its biological racism and total warfare as just another, albeit extreme, avatar of modern 
technicity alongside liberalism and Bolshevism, thus revealing himself as a radical conservative rather 
than a committed National Socialist. 
Remarkably, few of Heidegger’s most prominent students were outright conservatives; some 
were quite the opposite, such as the Marxist and 1960s counterculture icon Herbert Marcuse. In 
France, the introduction of Heideggerianism through existentialism and poststructuralism coincided 
with a marked left-wing wave. Leo Strauss’s work is often considered a key source of intellectual 
inspiration for American neoconservatives – but this status ultimately hinges on Strauss’s relentless 
battle against relativism and Heideggerian “radical” historicism (Strauss 1953, 9–34; 1961, 251; 
Gottfried 2012, 43–57). Strauss endorsed a democracy that would not be founded on individualistic 
relativism, but rather on values conceived as universal and on a Platonic form of natural right. 
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Precisely this made Strauss appealing to a section of the American right, but also fundamentally 
opposed him to the German conservative and historicist heritage. Hans-Georg Gadamer was 
famously accused by Jürgen Habermas (1967, 168–170) of ending up in Burkean-style conservatism 
associated with German historicism that rendered a Marxist-type critique of ideology unfeasible by 
insisting on the irreducible role of tradition in all understanding. In his reply, Gadamer (1967, 285), 
while defending the emancipatory potential of philosophical hermeneutics, credited conservatism 
with an important insight into the untenability of the Enlightenment’s “abstract antithesis” between 
reason and the authority of the tradition. 
Hannah Arendt, the most influential political theorist among Heidegger’s heirs, certainly does 
not fit the narrow category of “conservatism.” Nonetheless, her vivid interest in modern revolutions 
was balanced with a Roman-inspired emphasis on the political importance of authority, tradition, 
and preservation. She is perhaps most aptly characterized as a “reluctant modernist” (Benhabib 
2003): for Arendt (1951, 305–364; 1963), modernity was at once a possibility for political 
refoundation and an atomizing and leveling force which dissolved local communities into a 
homogeneous mass society that, due to the loss of communal forms of “common sense,” provided 
a breeding ground for totalitarian ideologies. Heidegger’s influence is traceable in the latter, bleaker 
evaluation of modernization as a nihilistic obliteration of local differences and traditions. His 
philosophy has thus channeled at least some Counter-Enlightenment implications of German 
historicism into contemporary political thought. 
 
5. Contemporary repercussions: multipolarity and ethnoparticularism 
The postwar denazification of Germany weakened, but did not eradicate radical conservatism: Freyer, 
Schmitt, and Heidegger all published further and remained influential. In recent years, many radical 
conservative arguments have resurfaced in rightwing political theorizing. In particular, Francis 
Fukuyama’s (1992) post-Cold War vision of liberal democracy as a Hegelian universal “end of 
history” provoked a new wave of historicist and culturally particularistic counterreactions. Among 
the most influential was Samuel Huntington’s (1996) theory of the clash of culturally and regionally 
distinct “civilizations” as the dominant matrix for new geopolitics – a vision partly prefigured in 
Schmitt’s (1939–41) model of a geopolitical ordering of “great spaces” based on different, particular 
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political identities but with a degree of internal political homogeneity. Although rejecting Western 
universalism as “imperialism,” Huntington (1996, 310–311, 318) did not surrender to moral and 
cultural relativism, either – rather, he advocated the search for shared minimal moral standards amidst 
global cultural diversity and the recognition of the uniqueness of the West amongst other cultures. 
Schmitt, Heidegger, and Huntington have inspired a new generation of conservative theorists, 
including, most prominently, Aleksandr Dugin and Alain de Benoist. The Russian Dugin, who has 
recently gained a questionable reputation as a chief ideologue of “Putinism,” characterizes his recent 
political theory (Dugin 2009) as a “fourth” ideological alternative to the great ideologies of the 
twentieth century (liberalism, communism, and fascism). For Dugin, the global ideological hegemony 
of liberalism stemming from the “Atlantic” (Anglophone) civilization threatens the particular 
identities of traditionally nonliberal civilizations, such as the “Eurasian” cultural sphere dominated 
by Russia. Dugin’s “fourth political theory” is a Schmittian and Huntingtonian multipolar geopolitical 
model that allows for vast differences between the major civilizational areas, each equipped with a 
particularistic political idea in tune with their particular traditions and ethnogenesis, yet presupposes 
a degree of internal cultural and political unity. While opposed to the late modern world of globalized 
and individualistic liberal capitalism, the fourth ideology openly exploits the relativist and historicist 
aspects of “postmodern” or poststructuralist thought against liberal unipolarity. Dugin (2009, 83–
100) explicitly proclaims himself an heir of the German conservative revolutionary movement and 
Heideggerian philosophy of history. 
The key figure of the French New Right, de Benoist (2004, 21, 63) criticizes the Western 
human rights doctrine, first, for being excessively universalistic in its attempt to govern the particular 
by abstract principles; second, for being subjectivistic in that it defines rights in terms of individuals 
and thus leads to relativism; and third, for absolutizing historically particular ideas into timeless truths 
and for imperialistically imposing the values of one culture upon others. However, he denies that this 
rejection of universal human rights would itself entail relativism, rather endorsing the “pluralist 
position” that humanity “presents incompatible value systems” (Benoist 1985, 99; 2004, 78). Every 
human being is equally a member of humankind, but this membership is “always mediated by a 
particular cultural belonging” (Benoist and Champetier 1999, 123). The pragmatic political corollary 
of this view is the doctrine of “differentialist ethnopluralism” or “ethnoregionalism”: universalist 
12 
 
“imperialism” must be rejected, each culture should stay confined to its geographical area, and 
Western Europe, too, has the right and duty to protect its cultural heritage (Spektorowski 2003). 
While traditional conservatism used pluralism to underpin traditional state-driven nationalism, here 
ethnopluralism is raised against liberal multiculturalism, in order to justify exclusionary political 
practices. 
Despite its complexity, the alliance between relativism and political conservatism has proved 
surprisingly enduring. The Counter-Enlightenment counternarrative of irreducible differences 
between cultures and epochs and the concomitant idea of history as nonteleological change has 
coexisted with the Enlightenment narrative of the universal progress of humanity in one form or 
other for more than two centuries. Contrary to a common conception, neither narrative shows 
genuine signs of abating – on the contrary, both have recently been reaffirmed, with Steven Pinker 
(2018) as the most prominent recent herald of the latter, and may well continue to configure the 
ideological parameters of the future for an indefinite time. 
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